

16 December 1954

MEMO FOR THE RECORD OF THE CLARK COMMITTEE

Office of Scientific Intelligence

0900-1000 Applied Science Branch  
1000-1200 Operations Staff  
1300-1600 Briefing, 2030 "I" Building

1. Colonel Miller felt that the Applied Science Branch duplicated almost completely the efforts and missions of the Department of Defense. He couldn't justify this twin effort in his own mind, and was of the opinion that this Branch was a convenience for the Agency's own interests in weapons development.

2. McGruder rationalized the mission of the Applied Science Branch in that its principal responsibility was to ascertain that policy did not enter into military intelligence products; thereby alerting the DCI or AD/SI to discrepancies.

3. Again the question of military personnel assigned the Agency was raised. Were those assigned competent, or just cast-offs from the services? Were those so assigned happy with their work in the Agency? Why were the services called upon to so supply personnel when they themselves were short-handed?

4. Other questions followed the previous days' pattern (i.e., What happens to your end product? Who are your principal sources? What does DD(P) offer you? How do you coordinate with other offices in the Agency? How do you complement one another?).

5. On leaving the Applied Science Branch, McGruder stated, "I'm going to have to come back and spend some more time here", indicating he was not convinced of the necessity for this phase of OSI's efforts.


6. In the Operations Staff, Colonel Miller had a great deal of trouble determining the purpose of this operation. He rationalized its primary function as source and project development, under National Security Council and Agency direction. McGruder wondered if many of the missions engaged in by Operations Staff were not correctly allocated. "Couldn't you perform the same type of thing by having AD/SI appoint an ad hoc committee as problems arise, and not function as a permanent committee?"

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7. Colonel Miller was very confused over the division of responsibility between the Operations and Production Staff, where he felt duplication of effort and missions existed. In McGruder's estimation, Operations Staff functions as "a five percenter!"

8. Colonel Miller discussed the question of OSI consultants at length. He asked if the Agency coordinated their consultants with those used by other agencies, what happened to consultants when they were dropped (and why weren't they maintained on an inactive status instead of dropping them completely, due to the cost of clearing), who chose consultants and why.

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cc:



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MEMO FOR THE RECORD OF THE CLARK COMMITTEE

Office of Scientific Intelligence

0900-1000 [REDACTED]

1000-1200 Operations Staff

1300-1600 Briefing, [REDACTED]

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cc:

Inspector General